Is Europe Irrelevant in International Affairs?
As Donald Trump signalled that he would take two weeks to consider whether to bomb Iran, Europe’s leaders gathered to work out how to engage Iran in negotiations over its nuclear programme and seek a negotiated end to the war with Israel. Then, without consultation with or even warning to its European and NATO allies, the US bombed the facilities at Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan and the war ended. Europe’s leaders, wholly wrong-footed, were left grasping at thin air.
As Donald Trump threatened to pull support from Ukraine in an effort to force both sides to the negotiating table, Europe’s leaders, shuttling back and forth on trains between capitals and Kyiv, gathered to create a ‘Coalition of the Willing’ to police the ceasefire. Donald Trump refused to even consider the involvement of US troops as a backstop. Europe’s initiative fizzled quietly out.
Both European initiatives were effectively stillborn. Their failure brought home the painful truth: that Europe can do very little without US support. Economically, the EU has significant power. But that power is not matched by an ability to project similar diplomatic and military force.
This is, of course, partly President Trump’s intent. He reserves a specific and particular loathing for the EU – after all, it stands for everything he opposes (respect for the rule of law, protection of minorities, genuine economic competitor to the US, protection of the environment and above all, a rejection of petty nationalism). Anything, therefore, that undermines it, or demonstrates its weaknesses and shortcomings is like catnip to him. In his vision of a world divided into Great Power influence zones, Europe simply does not feature.
But to blame Trump entirely for Europe’s ineffectiveness would ignore the fact that the EU (and Europe) has not, for some time, been master of its own fate. This is partly the fault of its own structures, with foreign policy and defence being reserved powers. It is also partly the inevitability of 27 countries each trying to protect their own interests (and placing their individual needs above those of the collective) within structures which require unanimity. But it is also the victim of a deliberate strategy deployed by right-wing leaders such a Viktor Orban, who deliberately set out to trammel the EU, dividing its common purpose and weakening its ability to take common foreign policy positions on a range of issues from imposing effective sanctions on Russia (or freezing Russian assets) to reaching a common position on Gaza.
Whatever the reason, if the EU intends to have a genuine and effective voice on the international stage, it needs radical reform. And quickly. Failure to respond risks making the EU irrelevant – which is what Putin and Trump (and Orban, amongst other EU leaders) want. The examples below demonstrate how the EU’s lack of internal cohesion and its archaic voting systems have made it incapable of responding with the necessary speed to rapidly changing world events.
EU Response to Gaza
In the aftermath of the 7 October attacks, as the US condemned Hamas with full voice and offered unconditional (and apparently bottomless) military and diplomatic support to Israel, the EU equivocated as deep rifts emerged between its member states.
On the one hand, Germany, Austria, the Czech Republic (for historical reasons) and Hungary (more from a desire to make mischief, than from any deeply-held conviction) were extremely reluctant to endorse anything that might constrain Israel’s military operations. On the other hand, states like Spain and Ireland called for a ceasefire, whilst France, Belgium, and Sweden tried to broker a middle ground. The result was confusion: whilst some EU leaders expressed emphatic solidarity with Israel, others criticized Israel’s bombardment of Gaza. This disunity hamstrung the EU’s ability to issue timely, forceful joint statements – it took weeks of wrangling to even agree the wording of an anodyne statement.
These divisions have continued to hamper the EU’s ability to respond to the disastrous humanitarian crisis in Gaza. The EU only agreed to review the EU–Israel Association Agreement in May 2024. Although the 2025 European Council Summit condemned the “catastrophic humanitarian situation” and the “unacceptable number of civilian casualties” in Gaza, the Summit’s conclusions contained a timid statement deploring the suffering, but failing to offer any concrete action.
The lack of unity greatly diminished the EU’s influence. Europe was reduced to a “bit player” on the Gaza crisis. The EU Foreign Policy Chief, Josep Borrell lamented that Europe was “relegated to the sidelines” of diplomacy, “lingering at the margins” while others (namely the US, Egypt and Qatar) shaped the outcomes. The EU’s inability to act decisively or coherently did not go unnoticed by either Israelis or Palestinians (in the process damaging the EU’s moral position) and meant that the US could proceed largely on its own path, with no effective European voice to counterbalance its policy. This internal division has weakened Europe’s claim to “geopolitical” leadership and put transatlantic coordination – already under pressure over the response to Ukraine – under further tension.
Russia-Ukraine
Washington’s response to the Russian invasion was resolute. Immediate condemnation and strong security support (including significant military aid packages). Although the continued military support ran into difficulties towards the end of Biden’s term and has been patchy during the first six months of Trump’s presidency, the US has continued to make the running – including, under President Trump, a willingness to venture into direct talks with Moscow to seek a ceasefire (whether that was well-advised or not, is a different question…).
In contrast, the EU has been riven with internal splits. Whilst all member states condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and there was initially an impressive consensus on the supply of arms and the imposition of sanctions, more recently, consensus has frayed on concrete commitments – especially regarding heavy weapon transfers and long-term security aid. Italy, Slovakia and Hungary are the dissenting voices with Poland and the Baltic countries pushing for increased military aid to Ukraine and Germany counselling caution. The story was the same on sanctions - new rounds of Russia sanctions were repeatedly delayed or diluted by Hungary and, from mid-2025, by Slovakia as well, with the routine six-month renewal of existing Russia sanctions becoming a bargaining chip for Hungary and measures (such as those targeting Russian diamonds or the nuclear sector) repeatedly postponed or weakened as Moscow exploited EU splits.
The lack of internal unity (and ability to supply large quantities of the right weapons) has not only undermined the credibility of the EU’s claim to be Ukraine’s number one ally, but it has also highlighted the importance of the US to Ukraine’s survival – in the process facilitating President Trump’s pursuit of an America first agenda, and side-lining the EU as an effective partner. What is worse, the EU disunity has almost certainly strengthened Russian belief that it can outlast Western unity.
China Policy
Over the past 18 months, Washington has pushed ahead with unilateral China initiatives – expanding export controls on sensitive technologies; imposing tariffs and investment curbs on Chinese industries; and pursuing an aggressive industrial policy designed to compete with China. On issues from human rights to Taiwan’s security, the US has taken clear positions (such as high-profile visits to Taiwan or explicit pledges to help defend the island). Although the single-mindedness on Taiwan has waned somewhat under a Trump presidency determined to avoid entanglement in foreign wars, in respect of China in general, US unilateralism has only accelerated with President Trump’s arrival in power (think 145% tariffs….).
In contrast, the EU’s approach to China has seemed to depend more on the value of different Member states’ economic ties to China or the strength of their attachment to principles of human rights, than any coherent EU position. Whilst the US talked of de-coupling the two economies, the EU attempted to find a middle path, focused on ‘de-risking’ the relationship (with the EU describing China somewhat contradictorily as being at once a “partner, competitor, and systemic rival”). The inadequacy of this middle path was exposed by the fiasco of the attempt to impose tariffs on Chinese imports to protect the European car market from aggressive Chinese trade tactics. When the measure came to a vote, only 10 member states voted in favour of the tariffs, 5 opposed and 12 abstained – the measure passed only because EU trade decisions use majority voting. The EU policy response on Taiwan is another example of the EU’s failure to find common ground - Macron’s comment that Europe must not be “followers” of the US on Taiwan may have delighted Beijing, but it was not welcomed either by other EU leaders or the US (coming, as it did, hard on the heels of Chinese military drills around Taiwan).
Europe’s lack of confidence in finding a coherent response to the challenge of managing China is a vulnerability that Beijing has not been slow to exploit, offering trade inducements to some states (for example, Italy) whilst pressuring others, in order to divide EU Member States and prevent a coherent policy response. At the same time, it has also eroded the EU’s credibility as a major world economic power, willing and able to stand up for its own commercial interests and frustrated US and Indo-Pacific partners.
The Niger Coup
The US reacted pragmatically to the July 2023 military coup. They assessed that maintaining a working relationship with whoever held power was better than risking Islamist chaos in another Sahel country or pushing the junta wholly into Russia’s orbit. By condemning the coup without ever actually technically labelling it as such meant they could avoid having to cut security aid, thus paving the way to engage the military junta in talks aimed at preserving the US’ military presence (mainly counter terrorism (CT)-focused drone operations) which in turn allowed the continued support of ECOWAS’ (Economic Community of West African States) diplomatic efforts to restore civilian rule.
In Europe, however, the reaction to the coup was incoherent, divided between geostrategic and CT considerations. Whilst the EU did immediately suspend budgetary aid and security cooperation programmes with Niger and approve targeted sanctions against the coup leaders, France (as the leading EU power in the region) urged the EU to take more proactive steps. Without waiting for concerted EU action, Paris refused all bilateral contact with the coup leaders, insisted on maintaining troops in Niger; issued a harsh condemnation of the coup and offered strong backing to ECOWAS’ threat to use force to reinstate the elected president. Other countries had a more nuanced response. Italy and Germany for example condemned the coup and agreed to suspend aid and cooperation with Niger, but were concerned about the risks of military intervention in an already very fragile area. Hungary rejected France’s claim that the presence of the pro-Russian Wagner Group was a malignant force the EU had a duty to expel. In the end, these divisions led Europe to a lowest-common-denominator response which, by failing to offer a credible alternative to the US policy of engagement effectively delegated responsibility to the US. An outcome which was especially disappointing given the extent to which member states including France, Germany, Italy had invested in Niger as the “last democratic bulwark” in the unstable Sahel – providing military training missions, development aid, and partnership against jihadists.
In the end, the US were able to keep their drone force within Niger (albeit redeployed); whereas the French approach led to their forces being withdrawn from Niger in late 2023. But the lack of a united EU/US response resulted in the Nigerien military junta mocking France and courting Russia, inviting in its forces and effectively aligning itself against the West – which was exactly the outcome the majority of EU countries (Hungary excepted) sought to avoid – and offering a propaganda victory for Moscow, which also served to demonstrate how Europe’s influence in a key region was crumbling.
Conclusion
As a passionate pro-European, it pains me to conclude that the EU is itself to blame for its inability to respond with the speed and agility that modern-day crises demand. That failure adds grist to President Trump’s mill that the EU can be safely ignored and power to his predilection for unilateral action. At the same time, it reduces the EU’s capacity to have an impact on the global scene and to affect global issues – from climate change to foreign conflict. With regards to foreign policy and the EU’s ability to play a geopolitical role, voting reform is urgently required to move from unanimity to QMV (at least). And the EU’s High Representative, having been voted in and appointed, should be given the freedom to act in the name of the EU, without first having to gain approval from the Council.
The EU has done so much to heal the divisions of a continent scarred and traumatised by centuries of war. It has built the largest single market in the world. It has developed a social model which protects workers, women, minorities, environment and consumers. And it has re-united a continent split by communism, in the process raising the living and health standards of millions of people. But unless it makes changes to the way it conducts its foreign policy, it will continue to be outpaced by today’s fast-moving crises. It will continue to result in tepid and irrelevant communiqués. It will continue to remain hostage to those leaders of Member States who are themselves hostile to the EU. And it will continue to contribute to the perception of a Union declining in influence and relevance. That is not an outcome for which I wish.