Today’s celebratory demonstrations in Syria bring back powerful memories of standing in Tahrir on 11 February 2011, with sacks of rubbish piled around me and Egyptian revolutionaries literally painting their hope and optimism onto those paving slabs which had not been torn up and turned into projectiles over the preceding weeks.  At that moment and in the weeks that followed anything was possible.  First Ben Ali in Tunisia, now Mubarak in Egypt.  The next uprising had already begun in Libya, protests had erupted in Syria, Oman, Morocco, even Yemen. The Arab Spring was spreading across the Region.  For a short period, it seemed inevitable that all the leaders would quickly fall and the Middle East would be drastically, radically re-imagined.

But that is not what happened.  The leaders of some countries – Morocco, for example – promised (and delivered) reform.  But others, perhaps learning the lesson from Tunisia and Egypt that hoping for the protests to simply die away would not work, that fighting back was the only way to remain in power, did just that: fought.  In the end, only the first two countries to rise up managed to overthrow their leaders in anything like a peaceful manner – and the longer-term outcome of those two ‘successful’ revolutions has been a crushing return to the status quo ante. 

For both Libya and Syria, the long-drawn-out consequences of those heady days of hope and optimism of early 2011 have been appalling in lost lives, stability and opportunity. But in Syria, the events of the last two weeks have, perhaps, finally delivered the possibility of realising the dream of those early days of the Arab Spring.

History Repeating Itself?

Syria’s dreams of a better future have been dashed before, of course.  In 1918, with the defeat of the Ottomans, Prince Feisal and King Hussein were on the verge of creating an Arab nation. A combination of a lack of unity of Arab purpose and a determination from Britain and France not to relinquish their Middle Eastern ascendancy dashed that chance.  When Bashar al-Assad took power in 2000, the brief flowering of the Damascus Spring offered an enticing glimpse of a better future, before the ancient regime closed in around him again.  And in 2011, for a brief moment, it seemed that the Street might reclaim the power, but the brutality of the Russian and Iranian interventions gave Assad the confidence to ruthlessly crush his own people.  We should not, perhaps, have been surprised at Bashar al-Assad’s proclivity to violence – his father brutally crushed a Muslim Brotherhood uprising against him in Hama in 1982, destroying over half the city in the process.

Out of the Frying Pan….?

And whilst we can certainly hope and pray that this new uprising will result in a flowering of peace, stability and prosperity, we should not assume that will definitely be the case.  Hyat al Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS - Movement for the Liberation of the Levant) is a militia with a long and complex history.  Its leaders may be making all the right noises about conciliation and Syria for all Syrians, but HTS (and its leader Abu Muhammad al-Jolani) can trace its roots back to the Sunni Jihadist Al-Nusra Front with its Salafist connections, which in 2013 was declared as Al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate. Although Al Nusra broke from AQ in 2016, merged with four other armed groups to form HTS in 2017 and fought fiercely against AQ, suspicions remains about its real affiliations.

…But Missing the Fire…?

To be fair, in contrast to most Islamist factions, with their focus on the widder Ummah, HTS has repeatedly emphasised its ‘national credentials’ with a focus on fighting the Assad regime, rather than other Syrian groups or (despite its Jihadist and Salafist origins), pursuing a strictly Islamist agenda.  Although the HTS-affiliated Syrian Salvation Government (SSG) has the reputation of having run Idlib as an authoritarian Islamic State Indeed, HTS itself pursued a political and social programme concentrated on creating a stable civilian administration which prioritised the provision of services and the maintenance of law and order.

Since over-throwing Assad, Al-Jolani has continued this policy.  His approach to government has, so far, stressed conciliation and inclusivity.  The manner in which he dealt with the Assad government – working with the previous PM to help oversee the peaceful transfer of power to the transitional government and stressing the need to get the Institutions of State back up and running again – suggests an apparent intent to work for Syria, rather than for power.  HTS has been sensitive to public responses – taking Islamic religious music off-air from State TV broadcasts or removing HTS flags from State buildings. Christian groups in Aleppo (the first major town taken by HTS in its sprint across Syria) report enjoying religious freedom.  Jolani’s appeal to refugees and exiles to return and help build a new Syria demonstrates a welcome willingness to reach out to all compatriots. And the way in which he has contacted international organisations for assistance in securing military sites has offered the international community reassurance about his openness to dialogue.

Can he Hold it Together?

Only time will tell whether Al-Jolani can hold the fragile coalition of competing armed factions together long enough to build a stable Syria - there are media reports of clashes with the Kurds in the North.  But he has demonstrated impressive capability in leading and holding HTS together since 2017 and the fact that his lightning-fast campaign freed Syria from the Assad dominion where all others had failed for the last 13 years, will have only enhanced his reputation amongst Syria’s myriad competing factions.  The stakes are high: if al-Jolani fails to hold his coalition together it will result in more turmoil, suffering and brutality for a country which has already suffered so much and a return of the malign influence of Russia and Iran.  But if he can instil a desire to find compromise around a table, rather than on a battlefield, then a polar-opposite future is possible. 

The Implications are Pure Geopolitics…

The rise of ISIS led directly to a wave of Syrian refugees reaching the EU in 2015.  Angela Merkel responded by opening Germany’s borders.  What appeared a humane and thoughtful response was also partly an economic assessment – young, motivated people would take up work in Germany, creating employment and economic growth.  But the arrival of up to one million refugees in a short space of time also led to the rise of the Far-Right AfD party taking advantage of and fanning concerns about social cohesion.  With far-right parties on the rise (or already in power) across Europe, another refugee crisis (or terrorist outrage committed by a returned Jihadist released from a Syrian prison) might be the straw that finally cracks the increasingly embattled centre’s fragile electoral ‘barrage’ allowing the far-right to come flooding through.

But, as well as avoiding a repeat of the 2015 refugee crisis, Europe has a broader geopolitical interest in helping make a success of the latest (and let us hope, last) phase in the Syrian uprising.  The prospect of a stable partner on the Southern shores of the Mediterranean is attractive.  Not only as a possible future trading partner and tourist destination, but as a potentially crucial counterweight to growing Turkish and Russian and (waning) Iranian influence in the region.  

Of course, that does not mean abandoning crucial and principled support for human rights and protection of minorities.  Nor does it mean letting our guard down or naively assuming that Jolani will be everything we all hope he will be and that he has wholly abandoned his Jihadist roots.  Certainly, given its reputation in Idlib, the wholesale transposition of the SSG into the transitional Syrian National Government should at the very least give pause for thought (although, to be fair, given that no one had expected the Assad Regime to fall so quickly, this may be more a reflection of the urgent necessity of filling a political vacuum).

An Opportunity for Humility

The denouement of the revolution in Syria has been long-delayed.  But through unimaginable suffering and destruction, Syria has earnt this chance to finally build its own future and to re-imagine a region which has never been in such a state of flux in my 35 years of association with it. 

The West must engage with the process of political transition in Syria, even though doing so will be a delicate balancing act of protecting our interests and recognising when Syrian’s national interests may run counter to ours.  Above all, the West should avoid repeating the mistakes of the past. 

To end where I began: in 2011 we were so certain that the outcome of the Revolution had to be a democratic system which mirrored the West’s, that we ignored Egyptian voices telling us otherwise – the result was the Muslim Brotherhood.  There are echoes of that arrogance in the Biden Administration’s insistence that the transition in Syria ‘should comply with 2015’s UNSCR 2254’ (which calls for a process facilitated by the UN, establishing within six months non-sectarian governance and setting a schedule for a process of drafting a new constitution with free and fair elections).  The internationalist in me applauds that call, but the realist questions whether it is feasible - what may have been right and logical in 2015 may no longer be the case a decade later, not least since the UN’s reputation has been significantly degraded in the Middle East in the months since 7 October. 

The West absolutely cannot afford to be disengaged or disinterested in Syria’s future. Failure to engage effectively will re-open the door to Russian, Chinese and Iranian influence. Equally, failure to engage respectfully will be counter-productive. But we should not seek to impose an outside solution. We must listen to and work in partnership with Syrians, providing them advice and assistance (financial, capacity building and training where necessary/requested) and helping them forge a new political and social system which is as far removed from the barbarity of the Assad dictatorship as possible.  We must learn from our past mistakes and accept with humility that the system of government that emerges from the wreckage of the Assad era has to work for the new Syria – even if the final outcome may be far from that which the West would have designed.